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Cost and Benefit of Apprenticeship Training: 
A Comparison of Germany and Switzerland
*
 
For the first time it has been made possible to merge a German and a Swiss firm-level data 
set that include detailed information about costs and benefits of apprenticeship training. 
Previous analyses based only on aggregate data showed that the net costs of training 
apprentices are substantial in Germany, whereas apprenticeship training is on average 
profitable during the training period for firms in Switzerland, even though the two training 
systems are rather similar. This paper analyzes the reasons for these differences with 
matching methods. We simulate the impact of changes in certain parameters such as wages, 
apprenticeship system-related factors and allocation of tasks to apprentices on the cost-
benefit ratio using the counterfactual values of the other country. The results show that most 
of the difference in the net costs of training between the two countries can be explained by a 
higher share of productive tasks allocated to apprentices in Switzerland and the differences 
in relative wages. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  J24, J31, J44 
  






University of Berne 
Department of Economics 
Schanzeneckstrasse 1 
P.O. Box 8573 
CH-3001 Berne 
Switzerland 
E-mail: samuel.muehlemann@vwi.unibe.ch     
 
                
 
                                                 
* The authors would like to thank Ursula Beicht, Hermann Herget and Jürg Schweri for their work in 
conducting the cost-benefit-surveys that constitute the data base for this paper. The Swiss survey was 
financed by the Commission for Technology and Innovation (CTI) with the help of the Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (BFS). 1 Introduction
Over the past decades, a number of surveys have been conducted in Ger-
many and Switzerland that analyzed the costs and beneﬁts of apprenticeship
training from the ﬁrm’s perspective.1 Recent empirical research for Switzer-
land showed that the training behavior of a ﬁrm is inﬂuenced signiﬁcantly
by the net costs of an apprenticeship program, either directly (see Wolter
et al., 2006; Muehlemann et al., 2007) or indirectly by factors related to
the net costs of training (see Muehlemann and Wolter, 2007a,b). Walden
(2007) in a replication of the Swiss analysis concludes that costs and beneﬁts
also play a signiﬁcant role in the company training behavior in Germany,
although the impact of the net costs is smaller compared to Switzerland.
Nevertheless, these economic factors play an important role in apprentice-
ship training, even though economists have neglected the analysis of the
dual apprenticeship system for quite some time.
In this paper, we make a comparison of the cost-beneﬁt situation of ﬁrms
that train apprentices in two countries where the dual vocational education
and training (VET) system is very important and has a long tradition: Ger-
many and Switzerland.2 Despite the institutional and structural similarities
of the dual VET systems, the cost-beneﬁt situation for ﬁrms that train ap-
prentices is very diﬀerent if we compare the two countries at the aggregate
level. Apprenticeship training on average is proﬁtable in Switzerland already
during the training period, whereas German ﬁrms bear substantial net costs
of training apprentices.
This empirical ﬁnding is the starting point of our analysis. So far, it was
argued that structural diﬀerences between the two countries, such as diﬀer-
ent training professions, a diﬀerent industry structure, ﬁrm characteristics
like ﬁrm size or diﬀerent relative wages of apprentices and skilled workers
1See Noll et al. (1983), Von Bardeleben et al. (1991, 1995, 1997) and Beicht et al.
(2004) for Germany or Schweri et al. (2003) and Muehlemann et al. (2007) for Switzerland.
Wolter (2008) gives an overview of the development and the use of cost-beneﬁt analyzes
for apprenticeship training since the survey of the so-called ”Edding-commission” in 1974
(Sachverst¨ andigenkommission Kosten und Finanzierung der beruﬂichen Bildung, 1974);
see also Section 2.1.
2In both countries, more than half of a cohort of school leavers enrolls in a dual ap-
prenticeship program.
1could account for these diﬀerences. Furthermore, Germany and Switzerland
also diﬀer by a large degree with regards to labor market regulations and
institutions. In Germany, unions have a much stronger inﬂuence and it is
more diﬃcult to lay oﬀ workers compared to Switzerland. As well, German
work councils can directly inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s strategy at the micro level,
which includes the training of young workers. The studies by Acemoglu and
Pischke (1998, 1999a,b) and Franz and Soskice (1995) highlight the impor-
tance of labor market institutions and frictions with regards to the ﬁrm’s
decision to provide training. The contribution of this paper to the literature
is that for the ﬁrst time we can analyze the cost-beneﬁt ratio of apprentice-
ship training of two countries that have a similar VET system, but diﬀer
substantially with respect to labor market regulations and institutions.3
Our results show that the diﬀerence in net costs of training cannot solely
be attributed to structural diﬀerences of the two countries. Using matching
methods, we ﬁnd that the allocation of tasks to apprentices at the workplace
is an important determinant of the diﬀerence in the net costs of training. The
eﬀect is even more pronounced if the wage-level of skilled workers is high.
As a result, the beneﬁts of training, i.e. the value of the productive work of
apprentices, is much higher in Switzerland than in Germany and constitutes
the main source for the diﬀerence in the cost-beneﬁt ratio between the two
countries.
The paper is organized as follows: First, we discuss the costs-beneﬁt surveys
of apprenticeship training and provide descriptive statistics. The following
section describes the econometric modeling and the estimation strategy. Sec-
tion 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 discusses the implications of
our ﬁndings. Section 6 concludes.
3In the OECD Employment Outlook (OECD, 2004), the value of the overall index
for employment protection legislation in the year 2003 is 2.5 for Germany and 1.6 for
Switzerland. As a comparison, the United States have a value of 0.7, the United Kingdom
1.1, whereas Sweden and Norway have a value of 2.6 and France a value of 2.9. Germany
is ranked in the top third of the countries with highest index of employment protection
legislation, whereas Switzerland is situated in the lowest quartile.
22 Cost-beneﬁt-surveys and data
In this section, we introduce the concepts and the methodology of the cost-
beneﬁt-surveys of apprenticeship training and present descriptive results for
Germany and Switzerland.
2.1 Cost-beneﬁt-surveys of apprenticeship training
The concepts of cost-beneﬁt-surveys of apprenticeship training have been
developed by the ”Expert Commission on Costs and Financing of Voca-
tional Education and Training”in 1974, which is also known as the ”Edding-
Commission”. In our analysis, we use two surveys that were conducted si-
multaneously in Germany (see Beicht et al. 2004) and Switzerland (Schweri
et al. 2003), both with the same reference year (2000).
From a methodological point of view, the results of the two surveys are
comparable, even though there are some diﬀerences with regards to how
they were conducted.4 Nevertheless, most questions have been posed in
exactly the same way, as the Swiss questionnaire was based on the German
questionnaire.5
However, even though the questions are mainly identical, Beicht et al. (2004)
applied two diﬀerent methods to calculate costs and beneﬁts. The main dif-
ference is that ﬁrst method does not include expenses for part-time training
personnel, whereas the second method does. To maximize the comparabil-
ity of the two surveys, the German costs and beneﬁts of training have been
re-estimated with the model used in the Swiss survey, which is very similar
to the second method of the German survey.
4In Germany, the survey was conducted by personal interviews, while Swiss ﬁrms were
sent written questionnaires and have subsequently been contacted by phone for remaining
questions.
5The wording of some questions was slightly diﬀerent, e.g. Swiss ﬁrms were asked
about the share productive and non-productive tasks of their apprentices at the workplace,
whereas German ﬁrms could diﬀerentiate further between three sub-categories for non-
productive tasks. While such diﬀerences could result in a somewhat diﬀerent response-
behavior of ﬁrms, it should not aﬀect the comparability.
32.2 The cost-beneﬁt model
The costs of apprenticeship training mainly consist of the wages of appren-
tices wa and the cost for the training personnel wt. In addition, there are
expenses for material, infrastructure, external courses, costs for hiring and
administration of apprentices and other, denoted by X.6 This yields the
following costs for ﬁrm i:
ci = wai + wti + Xi
where ci denotes the costs for an average year of the training period per
apprentice. The calculation of training costs suggests that they are mainly
determined by wages. Hence, diﬀerences in training costs between ﬁrms are
primarily due to variables that inﬂuence either the wage of apprentices or
the wage of training personnel. The calculation of the beneﬁts b is based on
the type of work the apprentices perform. An apprentice spends a fraction α
of his productive working time h performing activities that would otherwise
be carried out by unskilled workers. The remaining time (1 − α)h, the
apprentice performs skilled work. In the ﬁrst case, we can assume that
the apprentice’s performance has the same value as that of an unskilled
worker, i.e. the wage of an unskilled worker wu. However, the value of the
apprentice’s performance for an hour of skilled work is less than the hourly
wage ws of a fully trained skilled worker. The values of the apprentice’s work
has to be adjusted by a relative productivity measure γ, since apprentices
are not yet as eﬃcient as a skilled worker with a vocational degree. Hence,
the beneﬁts of training to ﬁrm i are given by
bi = [αwui + (1 − α)γwsi]h
where bi denotes the beneﬁts for an average year of training per apprentice.
The net costs C of training an apprentice are the diﬀerence between the
costs c and the beneﬁts b. As a result, the net costs of an average year of
training per apprentice for ﬁrm i are given by
Ci = ci − bi
6For details on the cost-beneﬁt model see Schweri et al. 2003.
42.3 Data and sample selection
The data in this paper are from two ﬁrm-level surveys on the costs and
beneﬁts of apprenticeship training. The ﬁrst survey was conducted in Ger-
many by the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training in
Bonn (Beicht et al. 2004), whereas the second study has been carried out
by the Centre for Research in Economics of Education at the University
of Berne (see Schweri et al. 2003). All results presented in this article are
weighted by sampling weights that account for the stratiﬁed sampling.7 The
analysis focuses only on apprenticeship programs that last three years, since
programs exceeding three years last 3.5 years in Germany, but four years in
Switzerland, which would make a comparison less meaningful. The sample
used for the analysis consists of 1825 German and 1471 Swiss ﬁrms.
2.4 Descriptive statistics
The costs-beneﬁt ratio of apprenticeship training from the ﬁrm’s perspective
between Germany and Switzerland diﬀers signiﬁcantly (see Tables A.1 and
A.2 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics). The average costs of training
c amount to 15,537e in Germany. The corresponding value for Switzerland
is 18,131e.8 This results in ∆c between Germany and Switzerland of 2595
e per year, which amounts to 7785e in total for a three-year training pro-
gram. This diﬀerence is substantial, but relatively small compared to the
diﬀerence in the beneﬁt of training. The value of the productive contribu-
tion of apprentices is much higher in Switzerland, where the average beneﬁt
b amounts to 19,044e. In Germany, b is on average 8008e per year and per
apprentice.9 Hence, apprenticeship training in Germany results in net costs
7For the calculation of the weights for the Swiss survey see Renfer (2002) and Potterat
(2003). For documentation on the calculation of the weights for the German survey see
Schr¨ oder et al. (2001).
8To convert the results of the Swiss survey (which are reported in CHF) into e, we
used the exchange rate on September 1st, 2000 (1 CHF = 0.64687 e).
9In two recent papers, Zwick (2007) and Mohrenweiser and Zwick (2008) dispute the
ﬁnding that German ﬁrms incur high net costs of training. On the basis of ﬁrm-level
panel data they estimate the impact of changes in the share of apprentices on ﬁrm proﬁt.
They do not ﬁnd an impact on average, and in the sectorial analysis they only ﬁnd a
(negative) impact for manufacturing occupations. They conclude from this that only a
minority of German ﬁrms has to bear net costs when training apprentices. Without going
5C of 7528e p.a., whereas in Switzerland, ﬁrms can generate an average net
beneﬁt of 913e. As a result, ∆C between Germany and Switzerland for a
three year apprenticeship program equals 25,323e. Figure A.1 shows a his-
togram of the net costs for Germany and Switzerland. It can be seen that the
distributions of net costs are fairly similar. However, it can be observed that
the distribution of the net costs for Germany is shifted to the right, i.e. net
costs are higher compared to Switzerland. This large diﬀerence in net costs
is the starting point of our analysis. We ﬁrst focus on the components of the
net costs, to see whether they already show large diﬀerences in a bivariate
analysis. The main components of the costs c are wages for training person-
nel wt and wages of apprentices wa. The average wage for a management
position is 46% higher in Switzerland, whereas the wage for full-time train-
ing personnel is 24% higher compared to Germany. Wages of skilled workers
(administrative, technical/social, crafts) exceed the Germany values by 60%,
53% and 71%. Last, the monthly wage of a worker without a vocational de-
gree is 59% higher in Switzerland compared to Germany.10 In contrast to
the wage level for workers, the wage costs for apprentices wa are on average
higher in Germany than in Switzerland. For the ﬁrst and the second year
German apprentices wages are higher (∆wa1 =1344e), ∆wa2 =456e), but
lower in the third year of the training program (∆wa3 =-981e).
Further diﬀerences can be attributed to the number of days that apprentices
are required to spend in a vocational school. The average diﬀerence between
Germany and Switzerland amounts to 15 days in the ﬁrst, 10 days in the
second and 8 days in the third year of training. This is the main reason
why Swiss apprentices spend more days per year at the workplace within
the training ﬁrm. In addition, German apprentices also spend more days in
internal and external courses and internships in other establishments. As
into details, we do not think that the relationship between shares of apprentices and ﬁrm
proﬁt reveals anything about the net costs of training. Besides, it can be shown with
ﬁrm-level data that even if ﬁrms within a particular group of professions do not incur net
costs on average, it does not even imply that the majority of ﬁrms does not have to bear
net costs. In addition, we ﬁnd that the large diﬀerence in net costs between Germany
and Switzerland persists also within single professions, which contradicts the assumptions
made in Mohrenweiser and Zwick (2008).
10On the other hand, non-wage labor costs are higher in Germany (37.3% of the wage
on average) than in Switzerland (23% of the wage on average)
6a result, Swiss apprentices spend more time at the workplace compared to
German apprentices (+23 days in the ﬁrst year, +18 days in the second year
and +13 days in the third year).
Independent of the time apprentices spend in ﬁrms, major diﬀerences in
terms of net costs of training may occur due to the type of work and training
within the ﬁrm. Firms have a large degree of freedom with respect to the al-
location of tasks to apprentices during the time they spend at the workplace.
They can perform productive activities (either tasks usually performed by
skilled workers or tasks usually performed by unskilled workers, i.e. workers
without a vocational degree), or activities that have no direct value to the
ﬁrm (e.g. time for practicing or instruction time at the workplace).
The diﬀerences between Germany and Switzerland with respect to these pa-
rameters are substantial. The share of the time allocated to non-productive
activities to German apprentices exceed the corresponding values for Swiss
apprentices by 36%-points in the ﬁrst year, 28%-points in the second year
and 18%-points in the third year. Over a whole apprenticeship period, Swiss
apprentices spend 468 days at the workplace and spend 83% of this time with
productive tasks, while German apprentices spend a total of 415 days at the
workplace and spend 57% of their time with productive tasks.
However, the respective shares of qualiﬁed and unqualiﬁed productive ac-
tivities do not diﬀer much between the two countries. This also means that
the higher share of productive activities of Swiss apprentices is not due to a
higher share of unqualiﬁed labor compared to Germany. In line with these
ﬁndings, the relative productivity of apprentices performing skilled work in-
creases by the same amount over time; i.e. from 37% in the ﬁrst year to
75% in the ﬁnal year of the apprenticeship program in Switzerland and from
30% to 68% respectively in Germany. This is also an indication that the
two apprenticeship training systems lead to comparable outcomes, in the
sense that the relative performance of the apprentices compared to skilled
workers in the ﬁnal year of the training program is almost the same in both
countries (see also descriptive results in the Appendix).
Although the diﬀerences in some of the parameters of the costs and beneﬁts
are substantial, we start by testing how much of the aggregate diﬀerence in
the net costs between the two countries can be explained by structural dif-
7ferences alone. To do so, we run a series of OLS-regressions (see Table A.3).
The results show that the diﬀerence between Germany and Switzerland does
not decrease if control variables for ﬁrm size (model 2), industry (model 3),
job categories (model 4) and indicators for ﬁrms having a company training
center and full-time training personnel (model 5) are included.
3 Empirical modeling
The results in Table A.3 show that the large diﬀerences in the net costs of
training between Germany and Switzerland cannot be explained by struc-
tural variables such as industry, ﬁrm size or training profession. However,
since the net costs are the result of a constructed cost-beneﬁt model where
all parameters are known, it must be possible to explain these diﬀerences.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to simply apply an OLS-regression and in-
clude these parameters as independent variables, since they all enter the net
costs by construction. Instead of trying to directly estimate the eﬀects of
these parameters on the net costs, we apply matching-models analogous to
the treatment eﬀects literature.11 Instead of estimating the eﬀects of e.g.
an active labor market program of unemployment, we estimate the eﬀect of
hypothetically moving a ﬁrm step by step to the other country by changing
the parameters in the net cost equation that showed the largest diﬀerences
in the descriptive analysis. After doing this, we re-estimate the cost-beneﬁt
model for each ﬁrm and as a result we obtain a new estimate of the net
costs of training apprentices. This procedure enables us to determine how
much of the diﬀerence between Germany and Switzerland can be explained
by these parameters.
Let the observed outcome be denoted by Yi:
Yi = Yi(Di) =
 
Yi(0) if Di = 0
Yi(1) if Di = 1
where Di , for Di ∈ 0,1 is the treatment indicator, i.e. whether observation i
is a ﬁrm located in Germany (Di = 1) or Switzerland (Di = 0). Formally, we
are interested in the average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT), which
11For seminal work on matching methods see among others Rubin (1974) and Rosen-
baum and Rubin (1983)
8can be interpreted as if a German ﬁrm faces the environment of a Swiss ﬁrm,
such that
ATTi = E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)|Di = 1]
We are also interested in the average treatment eﬀect on the controls (ATC),
which can be interpreted in a way that a Swiss ﬁrm faces the environment
of a German ﬁrm, such that
ATCi = E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)|Di = 0]
If an individual or a ﬁrm could self-select in a treatment group, then the
matching estimator would be biased. In our case the treatment cannot be
interpreted as random, but the unconfoundedness assumption (see Rosen-
baum and Rubin, 1983) is assumed to hold.12 Hence, the assumption that
the treatment Di is independent of the outcome variables (Y (0),Y (1)), i.e.
the parameters of the net costs of apprenticeship training, still holds.
We apply a simple matching estimator (see Abadie et al. (2004)) to estimate
the counterfactual outcome, i.e. the value that is not observed for ﬁrm i.
While the observed outcome is its own estimate, the unobserved outcome is





















Yl if Di = 0
Yi if Di = 1
where JM(i) denotes the set of indices for the matches for a ﬁrm i (for more
details see Abadie et al. 2004).
12The matching estimates would be biased if ﬁrms had chosen their location based un-
observed factors that are related to parameters of the net costs of apprenticeship training.
Since apprenticeship training is usually not the core business of a ﬁrm, we assume that
ﬁrms base their location decision on other factors unrelated to the costs of apprenticeship
training.
9The estimation strategy is as follows:
1. In a ﬁrst step, we estimate the treatment eﬀects on a number of vari-
ables that are relevant to the net costs of apprenticeship training. The
descriptive statistics (see Section 2.4) show that the main diﬀerences
between Germany and Switzerland can be attributed to the following
parameters:
- Wages of apprentices and skilled workers and non-wage labor costs
- Parameters related to the VET system and institutions that aﬀect
the number of days where apprentices are at the workplace of the
training ﬁrm: the number of days that apprentices spend in vocational
school, external and internal courses, vacation and sick days as well as
internships in other ﬁrms.
- The allocation of tasks to apprentices at the workplace, i.e. the share
of tasks that have direct value to the ﬁrm and the share of tasks that
do not have a direct value to the ﬁrm.
The matching is conducted using a set of independent variables in-
cluding ﬁrm size, industry, job categories and two binary variables
indicating whether the ﬁrm has a separate company training center
and whether the ﬁrm employs full-time training personnel.
2. Having obtained counterfactual values for the parameters of interest,
both for German ﬁrms hypothetically facing the environmentof a Swiss
ﬁrm (ˆ Yi(1) if Di = 0) and for Swiss ﬁrms hypothetically facing the en-
vironment of a German ﬁrm (ˆ Yi(0) if Di = 1), we can now re-estimate
the underlying cost-beneﬁt model (see Section 2.2) at the ﬁrm-level,
while all other parameters of the model remain unchanged. As a re-
sult, we get a new estimate for the costs and beneﬁts of apprenticeship
training.
4 Results
In this section, we present the results of our simulations based on the
matching-models. The ﬁrst subsection presents the results for German ﬁrms
10receiving treatment for a Swiss ﬁrm environment, whereas the following sub-
section presents the opposite case, i.e. Swiss ﬁrms receiving treatment for a
German ﬁrm environment.
4.1 Treatment eﬀects on German ﬁrms
Instead of using the original parameter values of interest E[Yi(1)|Di = 1] to
calculate the costs and beneﬁts, we now use the estimates of the parameter
values E[Yi(1)|Di = 0] to re-calculate the new cost-beneﬁt situation.
We will proceed in two steps. We ﬁrst estimate all treatment eﬀects individ-
ually to get a notion of the relative magnitude of the individual parameters
and in a second step we will simultaneously estimate all treatment eﬀects
together.
The ﬁrst parameters to change are wages. German ﬁrms receive a treat-
ment for wages of skilled workers and apprentices as well as non-wage labor
costs, such that they match the situation of a comparable Swiss ﬁrm. The
average treatment eﬀects on the treated ATTi = E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)|Di = 1]
are presented in Table A.6. Average monthly wages for skilled workers are
about 1,300e higher in Switzerland; hence the costs of training increases
because the time for training personnel becomes more costly for a German
ﬁrm facing Swiss wages. However, the eﬀects of higher wages on the net
costs of training are ambiguous, since a higher wage-level also increases the
value of productive work that is carried out by apprentices. The results
show that the costs of apprenticeship training increase by 2214e p.a. and
per apprentice (see Table 1), whereas average beneﬁts increase by about
3340e. Hence, the overall eﬀect of higher wage costs is negative and leads
to a decrease in the net costs of training by 1126e.
The second group of parameters that get treated are related to regulations of
the VET-systems and institutions, i.e. the number of days that apprentices
are away from the ﬁrm because of vocational school, external and internal
courses, vacation and sick days. The average treatment eﬀects on the treated
are presented in Table A.7. The eﬀects of these parameters on the net costs
for a ﬁrm are smaller compared to the wage eﬀects. The costs of training
increase by 326e (the apprentice spends more time at the ﬁrm now, which
increases training costs) and the beneﬁts increase by 869e. This leads to a
11decrease in net costs of training by 534e for a German ﬁrm.
Table 1: Eﬀects of treatment on costs and beneﬁts for German ﬁrms
Treatment ∆Costs ∆Beneﬁts ∆Net costs
Wages 2214 3340 -1126
VET-system 326 869 -543
Allocation of tasks to apprentices -69 2865 -2934
Change ine compared to original values
In a third step, German ﬁrms receive treatment with respect to the alloca-
tion of tasks to apprentices at the workplace. As shown in the descriptive
statistics (see Section 2.4), there are large diﬀerences between the two coun-
tries. This has obviously a sizeable impact on the net costs of training
apprentices. The treatment eﬀects on the treated with respect to the share
of non-productive work are large and highly signiﬁcant (see Table A.8).
Having obtained the counterfactual values, we re-estimate the cost-beneﬁt
model again and ﬁnd that due to a now increased productive contribution
of the apprentices the net costs of training decrease by 2934e p.a.. The
eﬀects described above are economically substantial and add up to 4603e.
This explains 55% of the initial diﬀerence in net costs between Germany and
Switzerland.
However, it can be suspected that changes in some parameters aﬀect other
parameters as well; e.g. an increased share of tasks to apprentices that
have a direct productive value to the ﬁrms is expected to result in a larger
beneﬁt of training if the wages of skilled workers are high, i.e. an hour
of work by an apprentice is then worth more to the ﬁrm (ceteris paribus).
Similarly, at given wages and a given allocation of tasks, the productive
value of apprentices should increase if they spend more days per year at
the workplace. Therefore, all parameters of interest (wages, VET-system,
allocation of tasks to apprentices) get treated simultaneously and we then
re-estimate the cost-beneﬁt model again. If a German ﬁrm face Swiss wage-
levels, the parameters of the Swiss VET-system and allocate the share of
productive and non-productive tasks in a manner that a comparable Swiss
ﬁrms does, then the net costs of training for a German ﬁrm decline by 6594e
to 934e p.a. and per apprentice (see Table 2).
12Table 2: Costs and beneﬁts after treatment for German ﬁrms
Treatment Costs Beneﬁts Net costs
None 15536 8008 7528
Wages 17750 12148 6402
Wages & VET-system 18205 12679 5526
Wages & VET-system & Task-allocation 18066 17132 934
Absolute values ine
Summarizing the results, the main factors that account for the large diﬀer-
ence in the net costs of training are the wage-levels of skilled workers and
apprentices as well as the time allocation within the ﬁrm. The latter is the
most important and reduces initial net costs by 61%, given the simulated
values for Swiss wages and the Swiss VET-system. It should be noted that
the allocation of tasks per se has less of an inﬂuence in Germany where ob-
served wages are lower and apprentices spend less time within the company
(see Table 1, it then explains only 35% of the diﬀerence in net costs).
By simulating a change in all three parameters above, 78% of the initial
diﬀerence between Germany and Switzerland (which is equal to 8441e) can
be explained by these three groups of parameters.13 As can be seen in Table
A.4, this diﬀerence remains robust and signiﬁcant in an OLS-Regression that
includes structural variables as controls.
4.2 Treatment eﬀects on Swiss ﬁrms
The procedure outlined above can also be applied to Swiss ﬁrms. Instead of
using the original parameter values of interest, E[Yi(0)|Di = 0] to calculate
the costs and beneﬁts, we now use the estimates of the parameter values
E[Yi(0)|Di = 1] to re-calculate the new cost-beneﬁt situation if a Swiss ﬁrm
had to face the environment of a German ﬁrm with respect to the parameters
of interest. In the absence of treatment, training apprentices is proﬁtable
13It should be noted that the number of training hours as well as the relative productivity
of apprentices compared to skilled workers within the training ﬁrm have not been aﬀected
by the simulation, i.e. they were held constant. Reason being that a change in training
hours would result in a change of the relative productivity as well. However, the size of
this eﬀect cannot be determined with the data at hand and the net eﬀect of such changes
is prima facie not clear.
13on average in Switzerland. If a Swiss ﬁrm receives treatment with respect
to wages, the net costs increase by 3989e (see Table 3). The reason for
this large eﬀect is that the value of the apprentice’s productive work at a
lower wage-level decreases by more than the costs of training personnel. In
addition, the eﬀect of a change in wages is stronger for Swiss ﬁrms than for
German ﬁrms (as shown above in Table 1) because Swiss apprentices spend
more time with productive activities at the workplace.14
Table 3: Eﬀects of treatment on costs and beneﬁts for Swiss ﬁrms
Treatment ∆Costs ∆Beneﬁts ∆Net costs
Wages -1852 -5841 3989
VET-system -455 -2306 1851
Allocation of tasks to apprentices -111 -5998 5887
Change ine compared to original values
The beneﬁts of training apprentices decrease as well if Swiss ﬁrms receive
treatment for the VET-system. Since apprentices are less available to the
ﬁrm under the German regime, net costs increase by another 1851e. As it is
the case for German ﬁrms, the allocation of productive and non-productive
tasks to the apprentices explains the largest part of the diﬀerence in the net
costs of training between Germany and Switzerland, i.e. net costs increase
by 5887e due to a now lower value of the productive contribution of an
apprentice.
Adding up the individual eﬀects, net costs of apprenticeship training increase
by 11,727e, which is more than the observed diﬀerence between the two
countries. The reason why the sum of the individual eﬀects is so large is
again a simultaneity problem. A change in wages has a larger eﬀect if the
share of productive tasks assigned to apprentices is high, and vice versa.
Therefore, we re-estimate the cost-beneﬁt model again including the treated
parameters of interest simultaneously, as in the previous subsection 4.1. The
results show that the expected net costs of apprenticeship training for a Swiss
ﬁrm facing the environment of a German ﬁrm with respect to our parameters
of interest amount to 7918e p.a. and per apprentice (Table 4). These
14See Table A.6 for the average treatment eﬀects on the controls, i.e. ATCi = E[Yi(1)−
Yi(0)|Di = 0].
14simulated net costs exceed the observed average net costs of apprenticeship
training in Germany by 390e p.a. and per apprentice. As can be seen
in Table A.5, this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant in an OLS-Regression and
remains insigniﬁcant if structural variables are included as controls.
Table 4: Costs and beneﬁts after treatment for Swiss ﬁrms
Treatment Costs Beneﬁts Net costs
None 18131 19044 -913
Wages 16279 13202 3077
Wages & VET-system 15971 11620 4351
Wages & VET-system & Task-allocation 15924 8006 7918
Absolute values ine
The results also imply that the high wage-level of skilled workers in Switzer-
land is a big incentive for Swiss ﬁrms to substitute skilled work by appren-
tices. A larger share of productive tasks for apprentices would also have a
strong impact on the net costs of German ﬁrms, but compared to Switzer-
land, the eﬀect is weaker because of the lower wage-level in Germany.
5 Discussion
The ﬁndings of the diﬀerent cost-beneﬁt surveys, both for Germany and
Switzerland, have been remarkably stable over time.15 As a result, the
diﬀerences in costs and beneﬁts of apprenticeship training between the two
countries have been persistent as well.
For the ﬁrst time, it is now possible to make use of a merged data set with
observations at the ﬁrm-level to ﬁnd an explanation for the large diﬀerence in
the net costs of training between the two countries. In our analysis we have
shown that a large part of this diﬀerence can be explained with relatively
few parameters of the cost-beneﬁt model. The strongest parameter in this
respect is the use of time at the workplace. Swiss apprentices are engaged
15Von Bardeleben et al. (1995) calculate net costs of 9132e p.a. and per apprentice,
whereas the study by Beicht et al. (2004) reports net costs of 8705e. For Switzerland,
Schweri et al. (2003) ﬁnd an average net beneﬁt of training of 1353e p.a. and per appren-
tice, whereas Muehlemann et al. (2007) report an average net beneﬁt of 1787e.
15more often in productive work compared to their German counterparts.16
The open question that still needs to be addressed is why such a large frac-
tion of German ﬁrms is willing to incur net costs. Based on our results,
ﬁrms could adjust some of the relevant parameters that are responsible for
part the substantial net costs of training, i.e. the share of productive and
non-productive work allocated to apprentices at the workplace. One possible
explanation might be found in the diﬀerences of the labor market regula-
tions between the two countries. Due to the very high ﬂexibility of the
Swiss labor market, most Swiss companies seem to be forced to apply a
production-oriented training strategy, whereas labor market regulations al-
low most German ﬁrms to apply an investment-oriented training strategy
(see Lindley 1975 for a ﬁrst discussion of these two strategies).17
The mobility of apprentices after graduation is in line with this hypothesis.
On average, only 36% of Swiss apprentices remain within the training ﬁrm
on year after graduation in the year 2000 (see Wolter and Schweri 2002).
In Germany, the corresponding value is more than 50% (64% in West Ger-
many and 46% in East Germany, see Bundesministerium f¨ ur Bildung und
Forschung 2002). This could explain, why there is less pressure on German
ﬁrms to productively use their apprentices during the training period. But
it is more diﬃcult to explain why not more of the German companies go
for a double dividend, that is combining net beneﬁts (or at least lower net
costs) during training with beneﬁts after training that arise due to the com-
pressed wage structure induced by labor market frictions and regulations
(see Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 1999a,b). A possible reason for the rela-
tive reluctance of German ﬁrms to substitute skilled or even unskilled work
16The relatively low amount of productive work of German apprentices had already been
highlighted in a comparison of German and French apprentices in the study of Foug` ere
and Schwerdt (2002) using the IAB-establishment panel for Germany and applying a
production function approach.
17Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner (2008) ﬁnd, on the basis of the IAB establishment
panel, that only 18% of German ﬁrms seem to follow a production-oriented (or substi-
tution) strategy. Firms following a substitution strategy are deﬁned by a within-ﬁrm-
retention rate that is lower than 20 percent over three years. Wolter and Schweri (2002)
show with Swiss data that following a similar reﬂection and without directly observing the
net costs of training, that more than 70% of the Swiss ﬁrms training apprentices follow a
production-oriented strategy. The comparison of the two results is in line with the results
of studies that use directly observed net costs of training.
16by apprentices might be the strength and behavior of trade unions or work
councils. An increased productive contribution of apprentices would make
jobs for unskilled or low-skilled workers obsolete, and hence increase unem-
ployment for these worker groups, at least in a static view of the economy.
However, net costs of training are - as was shown in recent research (see
Section 1) - an important determinant of the ﬁrm’s decision to train appren-
tices. Hence, there is a trade-oﬀ between unemployment and the number
of apprenticeship posts, even if we would adopt a static view of the labor
market.18
An important matter related to the time use of apprentices at the work-
place are the implications on the quality of training. Trade unions, ﬁrms
and policy makers might advocate against a more substantial involvement
of apprentices in productive work. It might be the case that apprentices
acquire some competencies only by performing non-productive tasks within
the company, such as self-learning. It might well be possible that these com-
petencies are also of importance to the employer, and therefore a ﬁrm would
be willing to incur substantial net costs of training. However, as was shown
in Section 2.4, the relative performance of apprentices at the end of their
training period seems to be identical in both countries. Hence, it would be
diﬃcult to argue that the benchmarks for comparison are much higher in
Germany than in Switzerland. In any case, while the impact of the time and
work allocation on the net costs of training is clear, its potential inﬂuence
on the quality of learning and long-term employment opportunities is open
for future research.
6 Conclusions
The diﬀerence in the net costs of training apprentices from the ﬁrm’s per-
spective between Germany and Switzerland amounts to 25,000e for a three-
year training program. Using matching-models, we have shown that this
large diﬀerence is due to diﬀerences in relative wages, diﬀerent regulations
of the vocational education and training systems and, most importantly, to
18A further aspect to be examined in the future are possible diﬀerences in the qualiﬁca-
tions of apprentices, as these may have an impact on costs and beneﬁts of apprenticeship
training.
17how a ﬁrm allocates tasks to its apprentices, being either activities with a
productive value or activities that do not result in a productive value for the
ﬁrm. Since the diﬀerence in the cost-beneﬁt ratio between Germany and
Switzerland is to a large degree due to parameters than can be inﬂuenced
by a ﬁrm, it is important to understand why a majority of German ﬁrms is
willing to bear net costs of training. While our data does not provide a direct
answer to this question, we can still draw important implications. Employ-
ment protection legislation is much less pronounced in Switzerland than in
Germany, hence Swiss ﬁrms are forced to train apprentices in a cost-eﬃcient
manner. Furthermore, the more pronounced wage diﬀerential between ap-
prentices and unskilled and skilled labor in Switzerland is an incentive for
Swiss ﬁrms to apply a production-oriented instead of an investment-oriented
training strategy. However, a further deregulation of the German labor mar-
ket might force ﬁrms to allocate a higher share of productive tasks to their
apprentices.
18References
Abadie, Alberto, David Drukker, Jane Leber Herr, and Guido W. Imbens
(2004). Implementing matching estimators for average treatment eﬀects
in Stata. Stata Journal 4(3), 290–311.
Acemoglu, Daron and Joern-Steﬀen Pischke (1998). Why Do Firms Train?
Theory and Evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113(1), 79–119.
Acemoglu, Daron and Joern-Steﬀen Pischke (1999a). Beyond Becker: Train-
ing in Imperfect Labour Markets. Economic Journal 109(453), –42.
Acemoglu, Daron and Joern-Steﬀen Pischke (1999b). The Structure of
Wages and Investment in General Training. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 107(3), 539–72.
Beicht, Ursula, G¨ unter Walden, and Hermann Herget (2004). Kosten und
Nutzen der betreiblichen Berufsausbildung in Deutschland. Bundesinsti-
tut f¨ ur Berufsbildung. Berichte zur beruﬂichen Bildung, Heft 264. Bertels-
mann: Bielefeld.
Bundesministerium f¨ ur Bildung und Forschung (2002). Berufsbildungsbericht
2002. Bonn: Bundesministerium f¨ ur Bildung und Forschung.
Foug` ere, Denis and Wolfgang Schwerdt (2002). Are Apprentices Productive?
Konjunkturpolitik 48(3-4), 317–46.
Franz, Wolfgang and David Soskice (1995). The German Apprenticeship
System. In F.Buttler, W.Franz, R.Schettkat, and D.Soskice (Eds.), Insti-
tutional Frameworks and Labour Market Performance. Comparative Views
on the U.S. and German Economies., pp. 208–34. Routledge, London,
New York.
Lindley, Robert M. (1975). The Demand for Apprentice Recruits by the En-
gineering Industry, 1951-71. Scottish Journal of Political Economy 22(1),
1–24.
Mohrenweiser, Jens and Uschi Backes-Gellner (2008). Apprenticeship Train-
ing - What for? Investment in Human Capital or Substitute for Cheap
19Labour? Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0017, University
of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
Mohrenweiser, Jens and Thomas Zwick (2008). Why do Firms Train Ap-
prentices? The Net Cost Puzzle Reconsidered. Economics of Education
Working Paper Series 0016, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy
and Business Economics (ISU).
Muehlemann, Samuel, Juerg Schweri, Rainer Winkelmann, and Stefan C.
Wolter (2007). An Empirical Analysis of the Decision to Train Appren-
tices. Labour 21(3), 419–441.
Muehlemann, Samuel and Stefan C. Wolter (2007a). Bildungsqualit¨ at, de-
mographischer Wandel, Struktur der Arbeitsm¨ arkte und die Bereitschaft
von Unternehmen Lehrstellen anzubieten. Wirtschaftspolitische Bl¨ at-
ter 54(1), 135–147.
Muehlemann, Samuel and Stefan C. Wolter (2007b). Regional Eﬀects on
Employer-Provided Training: Evidence from Apprenticeship Training in
Switzerland. Journal for Labour Market Research 40(2+3), 135–147.
Muehlemann, Samuel, Stefan C. Wolter, Marc Fuhrer, and Adrian W¨ uest
(2007). Lehrlingsausbildung - ¨ okonomisch betrachtet. Beitr¨ age zur Bil-
dungs¨ okonomie, Band 3. R¨ uegger Verlag.
Noll, Ingeborg, Ursula Beicht, Georg Boll, Wilfried Malcher, and Susanne
Wiederhold-Fritz (1983). Nettokosten der betrieblichen Berufsausbildung.
Schriften zur Berufsbildungsforschung, Band 23. Berlin: Bundesinstitut
f¨ ur Berufsbildung.
OECD (2004). Employment Outlook. OECD, Paris.
Potterat, Jann (2003). Kosten und Nutzen der Berufsbildung im Jahr 2001
aus der Sicht der Betriebe. Sch¨ atzverfahren. Technical report, Neuenburg:
Bundesamt f¨ ur Statistik.
Renfer, Jean-Pierre (2002). Enquˆ ete 2001 sur les coˆ uts et l’utilit´ e de la
formation des apprentis du point de vue des ´ etablissements. Technical
report, Neuchˆ atel: Oﬃce f´ ed´ eral de la statistique.
20Rosenbaum, Paul R. and Donald B. Rubin (1983). The Central Role
of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Eﬀects.
Biometrika 70(1), 41–55.
Rubin, Donald B. (1974). Estimating Causal Eﬀects of Treatments in Ran-
domized and Nonrandomized Studies. Journal of Eucational Psychol-
ogy 66, 668–701.
Sachverst¨ andigenkommission Kosten und Finanzierung der beruﬂichen Bil-
dung (1974). Kosten und Finanzierung der ausserschulischen beruﬂichen
Bildung. Bielefeld: Bertelsmann. Abschlussbericht.
Schr¨ oder, Helmut, Stefan Schiel, Reiner Gilberg, and Karen Marwinski
(2001). Nutzen und Nettokosten der Berufsausbildung: Methodenbericht
zu einer repr¨ asentativen Betriebsbefragung. Bonn: infas. Unpublished
manuscript.
Schweri, Juerg, Samuel Muehlemann, Yasmina Pescio, Belinda Walter,
Stefan C. Wolter, and Lukas Zuercher (2003). Kosten und Nutzen
der Lehrlingsausbildung aus der Sicht Schweizer Betriebe, Volume 2 of
Beitr¨ age zur Bildungs¨ okonomie. Chur, Zuerich: Ruegger Verlag.
Von Bardeleben, Richard, Ursula Beicht, and Kalman Feh´ er (1995). Be-
triebliche Kosten und Nutzen der Ausbildung: repr¨ asentative Ergebnisse
aus Industrie, Handel und Handwerk. Bertelsmann, Bielefeld.
Von Bardeleben, Richard, Ursula Beicht, and Kalman Feh´ er (1997). Was
kostet die betriebliche Ausbildung? Fortschreibung der Ergebnisse 1991
auf den Stand 1995. Berichte zur beruﬂichen Bildung, Heft 210. BIBB,
Berlin.
Von Bardeleben, Richard, Ursula Beicht, and Rita Stockmann (1991).
Kosten und Nutzen der betrieblichen Berufsausbildung. Forschungsstand,
Konzeption, Erhebungsinstrumentarium. Berichte zur beruﬂichen Bil-
dung, Heft 140. BIBB, Berlin.
Walden, G¨ unter (2007). Short-term and long-term beneﬁts as determinants
of the training behaviour of companies. Journal for Labour Market Re-
search 40(2+3), 169–191.
21Wolter, Stefan C. (2008). Ausbildungskosten und -nutzen und die be-
triebliche Nachfrage nach Lehrlingen. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.
forthcoming.
Wolter, Stefan C., Samuel Muehlemann, and Juerg Schweri (2006). Why
Some Firms Train Apprentices and Many Others Do Not. German Eco-
nomic Review 7(3), 249–264.
Wolter, Stefan C. and Juerg Schweri (2002). The Cost and Beneﬁt of
Apprenticeship Training: The Swiss Case. Applied Economics Quar-
terly 48(3-4), 347–67.
Zwick, Thomas (2007). Apprenticeship training in Germany - investment
or productivity driven? Journal for Labour Market Research 40(2+3),
193–204.
22A Figures and Tables





































-50000 0 50000 100000
Net costs per average year of apprenticeship (in Euros)

∗(dark grey = Switzerland, light grey = Germany)
23Table A.1: Descriptive statistics, German ﬁrms
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Cost per year and per apprentice (ine) 15536.230 5016.783 5494 81026 1825
Beneﬁt per year and per apprentice (ine) 8008.260 3974.080 0 31894 1825
Net cost per year and per apprentice (ine) 7527.971 5564.885 -16496 70987 1825
Monthly wage of management (ine) 3405.067 1159.064 665 15339 1825
Monthly wage of full-time training personnel (ine) 3034.555 200.224 1841 5215 1825
Monthly wage of skilled workers (administrative, ine) 2011.790 453.106 767 6136 1825
Monthly wage of skilled workers (technical/social, ine) 2279.005 529.185 920 5113 1825
Monthly wage of skilled workers (crafts, ine) 1895.212 354.695 614 4090 1825
Monthly wage of unskilled workers (no voc. degree ine) 1482.544 324.503 491 3068 1825
Non-wage labor costs (in %) 37.252 10.737 8 75 1825
Yearly wage costs for apprentices (1st year, ine) 7232.920 1945.024 1071 16069 1065
Yearly wage costs for apprentices (2nd year ine) 8229.483 2141.398 3675 18745 1168
Yearly wage costs for apprentices (3rd year ine) 9191.676 2377.987 1335 20967 1063
Vacation days (1st year) 27.330 2.715 24 35 1065
Vacation days (2nd year) 27.440 2.603 24 35 1168
Vacation days (3rd year) 27.202 2.872 16 35 1063
Days in vocational school (1st year) 66.112 17.783 39 100 1065
Days in vocational school (2nd year) 61.160 18.035 39 100 1168
Days in vocational school (3rd year) 58.173 17.982 20 100 1063
Days at the workplace (1st year) 134.101 32.530 0 187 1065
Days at the workplace (2nd year) 138.129 32.086 0 187 1168
Days at the workplace (3rd year) 142.350 31.912 0 194 1063
Share of productive tasks (unskilled, 1st year) 29.977 19.084 0 100 1065
Share of productive tasks (unskilled, 2nd year) 31.524 17.874 0 100 1168
Share of productive tasks (unskilled, 3rd year) 27.790 18.374 0 95 1063
Share of productive tasks (skilled, 1st year) 13.256 15.879 0 100 1065
Share of productive tasks (skilled, 2nd year) 25.834 19.399 0 100 1168
Share of productive tasks (skilled, 3rd year) 41.238 22.937 0 100 1063
Share of tasks with no direct value to ﬁrm (1st year) 56.974 23.297 10 110 1065
Share of tasks with no direct value to ﬁrm (2nd year) 42.927 19.885 7 100 1168
Share of tasks with no direct value to ﬁrm (3rd year) 31.349 17.960 5 100 1063
Relative productivity (1st year) 30.240 15.049 5 100 1065
Relative productivity (2nd year) 46.713 18.278 5 100 1168
Relative productivity (3rd year) 68.332 21.988 5 100 1063
Hours of ﬁrm-training per apprentice/week 5.436 2.855 0 36 1825
continued on next page...
24...continued from previous page
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Firm size:
1-9 employees 0.463 0 1 1825
10-49 employees 0.396 0 1 1825
50-99 employees 0.068 0 1 1825
100+ employees 0.073 0 1 1825
Company training center (yes/no) 0.015 0 1 1825
Full-time training personnel (yes/no) 0.024 0 1 1825
Industry:
Agriculture 0.039 0 1 1825
Manufacturing 0.181 0 1 1825
Energy, water supply 0.001 0 1 1825
Construction 0.105 0 1 1825
Trade, automotive industry 0.181 0 1 1825
Restaurant and hotel 0.045 0 1 1825
Transport and communication 0.020 0 1 1825
Credit and insurance 0.022 0 1 1825
Real estate, IT, R&D, Services 0.112 0 1 1825
Public administration, national security social insurance 0.024 0 1 1825
Health and welfare 0.117 0 1 1825
Other public or personal services 0.154 0 1 1825
Job categories:
Nature 0.088 0 1 1825
Food, restaurant & hotels, home economics 0.117 0 1 1825
Textiles, clothing, hygiene 0.038 0 1 1825
Construction 0.144 0 1 1825
Manufacturing, craft (technical), IT 0.097 0 1 1825
Trade, public administration 0.364 0 1 1825
Education, health, social work 0.135 0 1 1825
Media, art, social sciences 0.017 0 1 1825
25Table A.2: Descriptive statistics, Swiss ﬁrms
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs
Cost per year and per apprentice (ine) 18130.710 7137.790 6282 66720 1471
Beneﬁt per year and per apprentice (ine) 19043.530 5863.084 2748 60803 1471
Net cost per year and per apprentice (ine) -912.818 8097.626 -37076 57164 1471
Monthly wage of management (ine) 4988.087 1601.594 1941 19406 1471
Monthly wage of full-time training personnel (ine) 3759.393 678.115 1941 9703 1471
Monthly wage of skilled workers (administrative, ine) 3219.204 644.210 1294 11644 1471
Monthly wage of skilled workers (technical/social, ine) 3488.207 566.926 1941 7949 1471
Monthly wage of skilled workers (crafts, ine) 3244.225 647.023 1294 10078 1471
Monthly wage of unskilled workers (no voc. degree ine) 2351.211 406.262 1164 4164 1471
Non-wage labor costs (in %) 22.991 9.441 15 50 1471
Yearly wage costs for apprentices (1st year, ine) 5889.078 2175.177 1979 33188 1006
Yearly wage costs for apprentices (2nd year ine) 7773.313 2489.260 2573 27779 927
Yearly wage costs for apprentices (3rd year ine) 10172.420 2701.514 2492 29955 886
Vacation days (1st year) 26.305 3.970 20 35 1006
Vacation days (2nd year) 26.429 3.552 20 35 927
Vacation days (3rd year) 26.797 3.753 20 35 886
Days in vocational school (1st year) 50.806 17.977 36 188 1005
Days in vocational school (2nd year) 50.839 14.690 36 80 927
Days in vocational school (3rd year) 50.299 14.073 36 80 886
Days at the workplace (1st year) 156.694 26.183 0 194 1006
Days at the workplace (2nd year) 156.075 21.970 16 194 927
Days at the workplace (3rd year) 155.673 20.851 16 194 886
Share of productive tasks (unskilled, 1st year) 50.432 20.824 0 100 1006
Share of productive tasks (unskilled, 2nd year) 39.398 17.817 0 90 927
Share of productive tasks (unskilled, 3rd year) 28.224 17.901 0 90 886
Share of productive tasks (skilled, 1st year) 28.234 20.942 0 90 1006
Share of productive tasks (skilled, 2nd year) 45.430 19.475 0 100 927
Share of productive tasks (skilled, 3rd year) 58.467 19.671 0 100 886
Share of tasks with no direct value to ﬁrm (1st year) 21.334 19.154 0 90 1006
Share of tasks with no direct value to ﬁrm (2nd year) 15.172 12.322 0 70 927
Share of tasks with no direct value to ﬁrm (3rd year) 13.310 11.090 0 95 886
Relative productivity (1st year) 36.526 20.631 5 100 1006
Relative productivity (2nd year) 53.998 18.674 5 100 927
Relative productivity (3rd year) 74.637 17.776 8 100 886
Hours of ﬁrm-training per apprentice/week 6.582 4.712 0.4 20 1471
continued on next page...
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Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs
Firm size:
1-9 employees 0.554 0 1 1471
10-49 employees 0.337 0 1 1471
50-99 employees 0.056 0 1 1471
100+ employees 0.052 0 1 1471
Company training center (yes/no) 0.003 0 1 1471
Full-time training personnel (yes/no) 0.044 0 1 1471
Industry:
Manufacturing 0.067 0 1 1471
Energy, water supply 0.005 0 1 1471
Construction 0.172 0 1 1471
Trade, automotive industry 0.247 0 1 1471
Restaurant and hotel 0.073 0 1 1471
Transport and communication 0.034 0 1 1471
Credit and insurance 0.044 0 1 1471
Real estate, IT, R&D, Services 0.076 0 1 1471
Public administration, national security social insurance 0.079 0 1 1471
Education 0.023 0 1 1471
Health and welfare 0.112 0 1 1471
Other public or personal services 0.069 0 1 1471
Job categories:
Nature 0.037 0 1 1471
Food, restaurant & hotels, home economics 0.158 0 1 1471
Textiles, clothing, hygiene 0.058 0 1 1471
Construction 0.173 0 1 1471
Manufacturing, craft (technical), IT 0.053 0 1 1471
Trade, public administration 0.427 0 1 1471
Education, health, social work 0.081 0 1 1471
Media, art, social sciences 0.013 0 1 1471
27Table A.3: OLS regressions, observed costs and beneﬁts of apprenticeship training
Dep. variable: net costs of training (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
German ﬁrm 8,440.790 8,419.920 8,451.600 8,393.030 8,430.110
(341.242) (348.124) (354.404) (363.585) (364.929)
10-49 employees 199.767 220.980 54.200 19.107
(370.429) (376.404) (384.846) (385.219)
50-99 employees 93.905 162.186 -174.137 -282.606
(595.470) (614.528) (606.214) (605.345)
100+ employees 391.134 279.571 -209.029 -628.357
(415.817) (437.950) (473.382) (492.070)
Industry:
Manufacturing 2,366.010 970.504 920.371
(641.992) (1,029.978) (1,031.866)
Energy, water supply -316.896 -1,590.610 -1,698.850
(1,733.012) (1,858.260) (1,874.528)
Construction 1,880.500 612.369 520.503
(721.028) (1,194.618) (1,192.048)
Trade, automotive industry 1,477.740 109.714 22.190
(635.753) (939.205) (945.611)
Restaurant and hotel 2,550.590 2,497.990 2,473.510
(894.965) (1,275.705) (1,275.058)
Transport and communication 3,651.530 1,820.940 1,561.270
(1,398.953) (1,632.160) (1,657.751)
Credit and insurance 3,638.580 2,059.820 1,931.520
(1,099.665) (1,366.846) (1,370.024)
Real estate, IT, R&D, Services 2,521.980 553.959 441.937
(691.622) (1,078.059) (1,078.730)
Public administration, national 1,286.720 -278.372 -378.849
security social insurance (887.510) (1,176.751) (1,179.366)
Education 3,619.290 2,016.980 1,963.060
(2,348.171) (2,486.687) (2,489.859)
Health and welfare 3,246.500 1,967.920 2,088.280
(719.882) (1,362.896) (1,376.286)
Other public or personal services 2,027.510 426.637 363.075
(651.300) (1,046.911) (1,047.613)
Job categories:
Food, restaurant & hotels, 54.141 -11.463
home economics (955.911) (948.167)




Manufacturing, craft (technical), IT 3,165.840 3,139.490
(1,019.026) (1,020.814)
Trade, public administration 1,699.870 1,814.790
(880.167) (882.828)
Education, health, social work 1,387.390 1,233.130
(1,242.508) (1,252.914)
Media, art, social sciences 7,558.310 7,618.330
(1,543.077) (1,534.213)
Company training center (yes/no) 2,071.430
(1,733.244)
Full-time training personnel (yes/no) 2,324.600
(849.778)
Constant -912.818 -1,005.990 -3,205.990 -3,126.110 -3,165.940
(299.064) (306.055) (616.256) (616.175) (617.894)
Observations 3296 3296 3296 3296 3296
R2 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.31
Robust standard errors in parentheses
28Table A.4: OLS regressions, simulated costs and beneﬁts for Germany
Dep. variable: net costs of training (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
German ﬁrm 1,846.730 1,910.919 1,584.286 1,518.782 1,494.398
(349.941) (356.250) (364.609) (375.699) (377.170)
10-49 employees -264.654 -226.310 -260.562 -304.467
(379.584) (380.359) (390.564) (389.977)
50-99 employees -977.910 -731.006 -745.597 -914.190
(629.499) (626.952) (629.718) (629.618)
100+ employees -1,807.712 -1,594.862 -1,663.611 -2,356.822
(506.899) (509.864) (542.126) (549.135)
Industry:
Manufacturing -3,237.304 -4,030.593 -4,058.566
(622.485) (987.465) (1,006.949)
Energy, water supply -7,094.034 -7,357.039 -7,406.507
(1,711.394) (1,828.870) (1,858.995)
Construction -4,455.558 -4,315.206 -4,386.021
(732.091) (1,170.478) (1,189.389)
Trade, automotive industry -5,203.741 -5,899.106 -5,900.113
(640.990) (888.674) (909.220)
Restaurant and hotel -2,024.355 -2,601.958 -2,478.782
(875.323) (1,239.204) (1,250.215)
Transport and communication -2,861.304 -3,567.934 -3,948.424
(1,380.569) (1,586.977) (1,595.350)
Credit and insurance -3,906.623 -4,436.078 -4,473.206
(1,072.804) (1,317.263) (1,333.070)
Real estate, IT, R&D, Services -4,044.649 -4,796.523 -4,912.206
(674.649) (1,038.439) (1,051.969)
Public administration, national -6,022.158 -6,570.551 -6,602.394
security social insurance (886.400) (1,143.894) (1,159.374)
Education -2,603.327 -3,087.283 -3,170.455
(2,342.277) (2,476.487) (2,489.077)
Health and welfare -2,169.132 -4,187.130 -3,587.140
(732.651) (1,413.714) (1,377.367)
Other public or personal services -4,725.082 -5,739.618 -5,695.255
(648.707) (1,028.784) (1,051.281)
Job categories:
Food, restaurant & hotels, 585.880 448.536
home economics (930.652) (929.231)




Manufacturing, craft (technical), IT 1,674.650 1,455.780
(1,007.161) (1,009.980)
Trade, public administration 526.824 627.074
(846.437) (852.247)
Education, health, social work 2,228.979 1,595.842
(1,333.208) (1,268.695)
Media, art, social sciences 6,962.142 7,004.361
(1,516.964) (1,515.669)
Company training center (yes/no) 8,567.197
(1,539.037)
Full-time training personnel (yes/no) 1,525.095
(919.606)
Constant -912.818 -673.885 3,414.702 3,461.746 3,436.260
(299.064) (309.378) (608.711) (615.555) (626.962)
Observations 3296 3296 3296 3296 3296
R2 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.09
Robust standard errors in parentheses
29Table A.5: OLS regressions, simulated costs and beneﬁts for Switzerland
Dep. variable: net costs of training (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
German ﬁrm -390.140 -421.420 -160.860 -180.680 -146.190
(259.280) (265.053) (269.393) (269.878) (269.847)
10-49 employees 166.783 211.124 -84.870 -119.006
(291.019) (292.243) (289.056) (288.966)
50-99 employees 117.168 -6.093 -612.068 -718.314
(495.079) (502.888) (488.326) (486.070)
100+ employees 971.863 488.801 -344.109 -755.769
(387.646) (391.754) (414.358) (435.082)
Industry:
Manufacturing 2,350.660 775.528 727.540
(619.503) (902.154) (910.658)
Energy, water supply 4,400.846 2,962.614 2,859.256
(1,128.537) (1,254.483) (1,259.600)
Construction 1,716.632 496.866 408.493
(630.694) (1,011.844) (1,022.267)
Trade, automotive industry 1,696.115 -12.274 -94.984
(611.050) (840.415) (851.101)
Restaurant and hotel 504.710 240.190 219.820
(728.777) (1,022.957) (1,026.416)
Transport and communication 3,111.870 776.030 522.210
(1,086.998) (1,280.718) (1,308.864)
Credit and insurance 6,317.404 4,227.744 4,105.709
(807.537) (1,052.044) (1,060.940)
Real estate, IT, R&D, Services 2,183.327 -169.936 -278.355
(634.284) (929.415) (936.987)
Public administration, national 4,175.946 2,195.305 2,099.668
security social insurance (661.890) (916.258) (923.419)
Education 4,673.543 2,602.036 2,549.236
(1,683.421) (1,786.396) (1,789.680)
Health and welfare 3,225.701 2,709.745 2,836.877
(688.774) (1,163.612) (1,173.615)
Other public or personal services 1,912.339 369.940 310.883
(634.343) (939.151) (944.165)
Job categories:
Food, restaurant & hotels, 316.100 251.050
home economics (756.271) (758.633)




Manufacturing, craft (technical), IT 3,572.716 3,542.930
(818.459) (827.119)
Trade, public administration 2,320.359 2,431.174
(714.681) (724.757)
Education, health, social work 477.830 317.940
(1,050.409) (1,057.123)
Media, art, social sciences 6,182.341 6,239.991
(1,049.710) (1,043.819)
Company training center (yes/no) 2,148.577
(1,710.082)
Full-time training personnel (yes/no) 2,230.240
(813.046)
Constant 7,918.108 7,804.317 5,416.413 5,515.731 5,477.531
(200.547) (215.430) (576.043) (573.453) (574.691)
Observations 3296 3296 3296 3296 3296
R2 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.09
Robust standard errors in parentheses
30Table A.6: ATT and ATC on wages.
Variable ATT ATC
Monthly wage of management -1806.713 -1938.711
(109.053) (116.864)
Monthly wage of full-time training personnel -841.785 -1014.987
(43.226) (53.106)
Monthly wage of skilled workers (administrative) -1247.164 -1347.959
(44.406) (57.428)
Monthly wage of skilled workers (technical/social) -1292.403 -1332.211
(45.660) (50.265)
Monthly wage of skilled workers (crafts) -1370.123 -1437.765
(36.666) (42.130)
Monthly wage of unskilled workers (no voc. degree) -921.304 -934.100
(29.359) (33.261)
Non-wage labor costs (in %) 14.258 14.496
(0.851) (0.950)
Yearly wage costs for apprentices (1st year) 1817.070 1903.519
(163.334) (230.941)
Yearly wage costs for apprentices (2nd year) 812.026 1216.873
(229.600) (229.385)
Yearly wage costs for apprentices (3rd year) -1064.446 -671.096
(306.396) (219.710)
Standard errors in parentheses
31Table A.7: ATT and ATC on parameters related to the VET-system
Variable ATT ATC
Vacation days (1st year) 1.201 0.914
(0.248) (0.333)
Vacation days (2nd year) 0.894 1.242
(0.281) (0.286)
Vacation days (3rd year) 0.712 0.950
(0.318) (0.269)
Days in vocational school (1st year) 11.528 11.947
(1.304) (1.758)
Days in vocational school (2nd year) 8.463 6.770
(1.454) (1.513)
Days in vocational school (3rd year) 7.283 4.112
(1.698) (1.423)
Internal courses (hours/year, 1st year) 12.310 7.711
(4.264) (4.954)
Internal courses (hours/year, 2nd year) 2.337 3.233
(5.664) (4.695)
Internal courses (hours/year, 3rd year) 3.479 2.191
(5.632) (4.052)
Internships in other establishments (1st year) 2.280 0.826
(1.036) (1.259)
Internships in other establishments (2nd year) 1.967 1.874
(1.250) (1.449)
Internships in other establishments (3rd year) 0.072 0.739
(1.258) (1.190)
Sick days (1st year) 2.848 2.623
(0.451) (0.587)
Sick days (2nd year) 1.725 1.938
(0.644) (0.683)
Sick days (3rd year) 2.044 1.841
(0.634) (0.579)
External courses (days, 1st year) 1.032 1.187
(1.655) (1.829)
External courses (days, 2nd year) 4.051 2.481
(1.542) (1.526)
External courses (days, 3rd year) 1.065 5.326
(1.975) (1.747)
Standard errors in parentheses
32Table A.8: ATT and ATC on task-allocation
Variable ATT ATC
Share of productive tasks normally carried -21.838 -22.916
out by workers without voc. degree (1st year) (1.522) (1.949)
Share of productive tasks normally carried -8.375 -7.828
out by workers without voc. degree (2nd year) (1.663) (1.676)
Share of productive tasks normally carried -4.770 -1.544
out by workers without voc. degree (3rd year) (1.975) (1.588)
Share of productive tasks normally carried -14.778 -14.652
out by workers with voc. degree (1st year) (1.426) (1.778)
Share of productive tasks normally carried -19.182 -20.703
out by workers with voc. degree (2nd year) (1.790) (1.818)
Share of productive tasks normally carried -12.339 -17.298
out by workers with voc. degree (3rd year) (2.457) (1.907)
Share of productive tasks normally carried 36.751 37.629
out by workers with voc. degree (1st year) (1.523) (1.998)
Share of productive tasks normally carried 27.800 28.696
out by workers with voc. degree (2nd year) (1.567) (1.489)
Share of productive tasks normally carried 17.416 19.196
out by workers with voc. degree (3rd year) (1.742) (1.405)
Standard errors in parentheses
33